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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a privacy implementation for symbolic control systems. Such systems generate sequences
of non-numerical data, and these sequences can be represented by words or strings over a finite alphabet. This work
uses the framework of differential privacy, which is a statistical notion of privacy that makes it unlikely that privatized
data will reveal anything meaningful about underlying sensitive data. To bring differential privacy to symbolic control
systems, we develop an exponential mechanism that approximates a sensitive word using a randomly chosen word
that is likely to be near it. The notion of “near” is given by the Levenshtein distance, which counts the number
of operations required to change one string into another. We then develop a Levenshtein automaton implementation
of our exponential mechanism that efficiently generates privatized output words. This automaton has letters as its
states, and this work develops transition probabilities among these states that give overall output words obeying the
distribution required by the exponential mechanism. Numerical results are provided to demonstrate this technique for
both strings of English words and runs of a deterministic transition system, demonstrating in both cases that privacy
can be provided in this setting while maintaining a reasonable degree of accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Control systems appear in a wide range of applications and are used in a wide range of problem formulations.
As control applications have become increasingly reliant upon user data, there has arisen interest in protecting
individuals’ privacy in some applications, e.g., in smart power grids [1], [2]. In response, there has been some work
on privacy in control, and sensitive user data have been made private in multi-agent control systems [3], [4], convex
optimization [5], [6], [7], linear-quadratic control [8], and a range of filtering and estimation problems [9], [10].
All of these problems protect sensitive numerical data by adding carefully calibrated noise to such data before they
are shared.
However, methods based on additive noise do not readily extend to non-numerical data, nor to sequences of
them. Symbolic control systems generate sequences of non-numerical data, which are analogous to trajectories for
ordinary control systems, and these are typically represented as words or strings over a finite alphabet. A symbolic
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2trajectory can represent, for example, a switching sequence prescribing modes to switch between in a hybrid control
system [11], or a sequence of finite subsets of state space to occupy, such as in a path planning problem [12].
A symbolic trajectory can therefore reveal one’s actions or positions over time, and this setting incurs privacy
concerns similar to those with trajectories of numerical data. Simultaneously, agents may need to share these
trajectories with other agents to jointly coordinate their activities, though a network may contain untrusted agents,
or communications may be subject to eavesdropping. Thus there is a need to share symbolic trajectories in a way that
preserves their accuracy while providing strong, provable privacy guarantees to users. Because existing approaches
do not readily extend to the symbolic setting, fundamentally new approaches are required to ensure that sensitive
symbolic data of this kind can safely be shared.
Accordingly, in this paper we develop a general-purpose method for providing privacy to sensitive words generated
by symbolic control systems. To do so, we adopt the framework of differential privacy. Differential privacy is a
statistical notion of privacy that makes it unlikely for an eavesdropper or adversary to learn anything meaningful
about sensitive data from its differentially private form [13]. Its key features include immunity to post-processing,
in that transformations of privatized data to not weaken privacy guarantees, and robustness to side information, in
that learning additional information about data-producing entities does not weaken differential privacy by much.
Differential privacy originates in the database literature in computer science, and it has been applied to protect
individual database entries in response to queries of the database as a whole [14]. It was later extended to trajectory-
valued data and applied in the control setting in [9], and has seen applications in both its database and trajectory
forms in a range of control settings [3], [4], [8], [9]. Differential privacy is most commonly implemented using the
Laplace and Gaussian Mechanisms, which add Laplacian and Gaussian noise, respectively, to sensitive data before
sharing them.
Differential privacy has also been applied to non-numerical data using the exponential mechanism, which randomly
generates responses to non-numerical queries based on how well those responses approximate the non-private
response [15]. The exponential mechanism has been applied, for example, to data aggregation [16] and data
release [17] problems, as well as pricing and auction problems [13], [15]. To bring privacy to the symbolic control
setting, we will develop an exponential mechanism for words over a finite alphabet.
Doing so first requires defining differential privacy in a manner that captures the privacy needs of symbolic control
systems, and the first contribution of this paper is formally defining differential privacy for this setting. Next, actually
implementing differential privacy requires defining “quality” in a meaningful way. The notion of “quality” we use is
based on the Levenshtein distance from a word. The Levenshtein distance counts how many insertions, substitutions,
and deletions are required to change one word into another. Given a sensitive word (representing a sensitive symbolic
trajectory), our differential privacy implementation therefore outputs nearby words (in the Levenshtein sense) with
high probability and, conversely, outputs distant words with low probability.
The second contribution of this paper then comes from the exponential mechanism itself, and, for a given sensitive
word, we provide the distribution over possible output words required to implement differential privacy. A naı¨ve
approach to generating samples from this distribution would iterate over all possible output words, compute their
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3quality scores, and then select one as a private output. However, actually executing these operations can be very
computationally demanding, and this naı¨ve implementation would require computing all pair-wise Levenshtein
distances among all possible output words, which can incur substantial computational expense.
Instead, to preclude the need for large scale computation, we specify a more efficient means of generating output
words, and this implementation constitutes this paper’s third contribution. In particular, we construct a Levenshtein
automaton that generates output words one letter at a time in a manner that obeys the probability distribution
required by differential privacy. The state of the Levenshtein automaton is defined to be the letter most recently
added to the output word, and transition probabilities are constructed between letters to determine which letter should
be added to the output word next. Levenshtein automata can be constructed efficiently, and our implementation
provides a substantial computational improvement over the naı¨ve approach. In this preliminary study, we consider
a restricted form of the Levenshtein distance, namely, we allow substitutions but not deletions or insertions, and we
defer the use of the full Levenshtein distance to a future publication. These modifications require only removing
certain transitions from the automata that we construct, and this can likewise be done efficiently, as will be shown.
This implementation will be demonstrated on both English words and a deterministic transition system to show its
applicability in symbolic control systems and beyond.
We note that a Levenshtein automaton can be represented as a graph, with each letter a node in the graph and
the transition probabilities acting as edge weights. Differential privacy has been applied to graphs in various ways,
including to protect topological characteristics [18], [19] and the edge weights within a graph [20]. This paper
differs from those works because we use graphs merely for the implementation of the exponential mechanism over
words, and we are not applying privacy to any graph structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the relevant background on Levenshtein automata
and differential privacy. Then, Section III formally states the differential privacy problem that is the focus of the
paper. Section IV next defines the exponential mechanism for words that we use, and Section V uses Levenshtein
automata to provide an efficient means of generating samples from this distribution. These results are demonstrated
for transition systems in Section VI, where we apply our theoretical results to the problem of generating private
runs of such systems. Section VII then provides numerical results for both strings in a general setting and the
transition system setting. Finally, Section VIII provides concluding remarks and directions for future research.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define our notation and establish some mathematical preliminaries for the developments below.
A. Languages
An alphabet is a collection of symbols Σ. A word over Σ is a concatenation of symbols w = σ0σ1 . . . such
that σi ∈ Σ for all i. We use the notation Σ∗ to denote to the set of all finite words over Σ. Any subset L ⊆ Σ∗
(equivalently L ∈ 2Σ∗ ) is called a finite language.
September 25, 2018 DRAFT
4B. Finite State Automata
Definition 1: A (nondeterministic) finite state automaton (NFA) is a tuple A = (Q,Σ, q0, δ, F ), where Q is a
set of states, Σ is an input alphabet, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, δ ⊆ Q× Σ×Q is the transition relation between
states, and F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
Definition 2: A run on an NFA A = (Q,Σ, q0, δ, F ) induced by word w = σ0σ1 . . . ∈ Σ∗ is a word q =
q0q1 . . . ∈ Q∗ such that q0 = q0 and (qi, wi, qi+1) ∈ δ. Automaton A accepts a word w if the final state of the
induced run is an accepting state qf ∈ F . We call the set of all words accepted by the automaton its language,
denoted by L(A).
Definition 3: A deterministic finite state automaton (DFA) is an NFA with deterministic transition function
δ : Q× Σ→ Q.
C. Transition Systems
Definition 4: A deterministic transition system (DTS) is given as a tuple TS = (S, s0, Act, T ), where
• S is a finite state space,
• s0 ∈ S is an initial state,
• Act is an input set
• T : S × Act → S is a deterministic transition function such that applying input a1 in state s1 will move the
system to state T (s1, a1).
Definition 5: A plan for a DTS is a sequence of actions a = a0a1a2 . . . ∈ Act∗. A plan a is in the input language
of a DTS, denoted a ∈ Li(TS), if it induces a run r(a) = s0s1 . . . ∈ S∗ such that s0 = s0 and si+1 = T (si, ai)
∀i.
D. Levenshtein Distances and Automata
To compare two strings, we introduce the notion of Levenshtein distance [21] and Levenshtein automata [22].
These tools can be used to measure the difference or edit distance between two strings.
Definition 6 (Levenshtein Distance [21]): The Levenshtein distance between words w1, w2, denoted dL(w1, w2),
is the minimum number of changes—insertions, substitutions, or deletions— that can be applied to w1 to convert
it to w2.
For example, the Levenshtein distance between “sample” and “examples” is 3, since the “s” at the beginning of
“sample” must be substituted for an “e” or an “x,” the remaining letter (“e” or “x”, whichever was not substituted
for the “s”) must be added, and an “s” must be added to the end of the word. We can identify whether a string is
within a specific Levenshtein distance of another string using a Levenshtein automaton.
Definition 7 (Levenshtein Automaton [22]): For a string x and a distance k ∈ N, the Levenshtein automaton is
an NFA Ax,k = (Q,Σ, q0, δ, F ) such that L(Ax,k) is the set of all words with Levenshtein distance less than or
equal to k from x.
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5For a given string x and a distance k, we can construct the corresponding Levenshtein automaton Ax,k as follows,
using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Levenshtein Automaton Construction
1: procedure MAKELEVENSHTEIN(Σ, x ∈ Σ∗, k ∈ N)
2: Q← {qi,e | i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |x|} , e ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}}
3: F ← {qi,e ∈ Q | i = |x|}
4: δ ← ∅
5: q0 ← q0,0
6: for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |x|} do
7: for e ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} do
8: δ ← δ ∪ (qi,e, xi, qi+1,e) . Correct transition
9: if l < k then
10: δ ← δ ∪ (qi,e, ∗, qi+1,e) . Deletion
11: δ ← δ ∪ (qi,e, , qi,e+1) . Insertion
12: δ ← δ ∪ (qi,e, ∗, qi+1,e+1) . Substitution
return Ax,k = (Q,Σ, q0, δ, F )
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Fig. 1: (1a) Levenshtein automaton Ax,k for all words of distance less than or equal to 2 from the word x = abc
from alphabet {a, b, c}. Accepting states are noted with double circles. (1b) A|x|k,x for all words of length exactly 3
and distance less than or equal to 2 from the word abc from alphabet {a, b, c}.
Remark 1: In this paper, for simplicity, we only consider substitutions and ignore insertions and deletions. That
is, we ignore lines 10 and 11 of Algortihm 1 when constructing the automaton. We call this distance the substitution
Levenshtein distance dsL, which is equal to the Hamming distance [23]. Full considerations of insertions and deletions
is a topic of future research.
Remark 2: The automaton Ax,k generated by Algorithm 1 can be pruned to a DFA that accepts only those words
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6whose length is the same as the length of the input word, |x|, denoted A|x|x,k. An example of this is shown in Figure
1. The details of the DFA construction are beyond the scope of this paper and are therefore omitted.
E. Differential Privacy
We provide here only a high-level discussion of differential privacy as background, and further details will be
provided in developing our privacy implementation below. The underlying goal of differential privacy is to make
similar pieces of sensitive data produce outputs with approximately equal probability distributions. The definition
of “similar” for sensitive data is specified by an adjacency relation. Adjacency is frequently specified in terms of
a metric, e.g., the `p-metric on a space of trajectories [9] or the counting metric on the space of databases [13],
and two pieces of data are adjacent if the distance between them is bounded above by a pre-specified constant.
Differential privacy then requires that adjacent sensitive data produce approximately indistinguishable outputs.
The notion of approximate indistinguishability is made precise by specifying a relationship between the probability
distributions of outputs corresponding to adjacent inputs. For adjacent sensitive data D1 and D2, a randomized map
M provides -differential privacy if
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(D2) ∈ S] (1)
for all S ⊆ range(M). The parameter  controls the degree of indistinguisability between the distributions of
M(D1) and M(D2), and thus the degree of privacy afforded to users. Smaller values of  provide stronger privacy
guarantees, and typical values range from 0.1 to ln 3. As noted in the introduction, differential privacy is immune
to post-processing, so that any transformation of M(D1) or M(D2) is also -differentially private, and robust to
side information, so that learning additional information about a data-producing entity does not weaken this privacy
by much.
Given a privacy parameter , an adjacency relation, and some form of sensitive data, the principal challenge
in implementing differential privacy is finding the randomized map M that satisfies the above definition. Maps
of this kind are called mechanisms for differential privacy, and we formally define the problem of finding such
a mechanism for words in the next section. This problem will then be solved in Section IV, which provides the
details of our privacy implementation.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we provide the essential privacy definitions that underlie this work, and then we formally state
the problems that are the focus of the remainder of the paper.
A. Word Differential Privacy
Here, we define a novel concept of differential privacy, called word differential privacy, that is appropriate for
describing privacy for sequences of states in symbolic systems.
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7Definition 8 (Word adjacency): The adjacency relation between words w1, w2 ∈ Σ∗ is defined as
Adjw,k = {(w1, w2) | dL(w1, w2) ≤ k}. (2)
Definition 9 (Substition Word adjacency): The substitution adjacency relation between words w1, w2 ∈ Σ∗ is
defined as
Adjsw,k = {(w1, w2) | dsL(w1, w2) ≤ k}. (3)
Definition 10 (Word Differential Privacy): Fix a probability space (Ω,F ,Pr). A mechanism Mw : Σ∗×Ω→ Σ∗
is word -differentially private if
PrΩ[Mw(w1) ∈ L] ≤ ePrΩ[Mw(w2) ∈ L]
∀(w1, w2) ∈ Adjw,k∀L ∈ 2Σ
∗
.
(4)
Definition 11 (Substitution Word Differential Privacy): Fix a probability space (Ω,F ,Pr). A mechanism Mw :
Σ∗ × Ω→ Σ∗ is substitution word -differentially private if
PrΩ[Mw(w1) ∈ L] ≤ ePrΩ[Mw(w2) ∈ L]
∀(w1, w2) ∈ Adjsw,k∀L ∈ 2Σ
∗
.
(5)
Essentially, a word differential privacy mechanism approximates sensitive sequences of symbols with randomized
versions of them. These randomizations must have similar distributions for two sequences that are nearby (in sense
of Definitions 8 and 9), and this is captured by the relationships between probability distributions in Definitions 10
and 11. Nearby symbolic trajectories are therefore made approximately indistinguishable to any recipient of their
privatized forms, as well as any eavesroppers who gain access to them, and these recipients are therefore unlikely
to determine the exact underlying sensitive word. This approximate indistinguishability criterion is the basic idea
behind differential privacy, and it is this idea that we apply to symbolic trajectories in this work. In this paper, we
restrict ourselves to substitution word differential privacy. The extension to word differential privacy is a topic of
future research.
B. Problems
Here, we consider two problems involving substitution word differential privacy. First, we consider the problem
of synthesizing a differentially private mechanism for an arbitrary sequence of characters from a given alphabet
Problem 1: Fix a probability space (Ω,F ,Pr). Given an alphabet Σ and a word w, find a mechanism Mw :
Σ∗ × Ω→ Σ∗ that is substitution word -differentially private.
Next, as a first step towards differential privacy for symbolic systems, we consider how to synthesize a mechanism
for privatizing runs of a deterministic transition system.
Problem 2: Fix a probability space (Ω,F ,Pr). Given a transition system TS and a run x, find a mechanism
Mw,TS : Σ
∗ × Ω→ L(TS) that is substitution word -differentially private.
A solution to Problem 2 would enable a designer to privatize a desired run of a deterministic transition system
such that an agent that observes repeated executions can determine the desired trajectory only up to bounded
precision. The price that must be paid for this is, of course, deviating from the desired run. This relationship
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8between performance and privacy is handled by tuning the single parameter , and this will be shown in more detail
in Section VII.
IV. THE EXPONENTIAL MECHANISM FOR WORDS
In this section we define the exponential mechanism for words over a finite alphabet. We first define the notion of
utility we use for our privacy implementation, and then we bound the sensitivity of this utility. With this sensitivity
bound established, we then formally define the distribution from which words should be drawn in order to preserve
differential privacy. Section V below then provides the means of efficiently generating samples from this distribution.
A. Utility for Words in a Language
An exponential mechanism is defined with respect to a utility function, which quantifies the quality of each
possible output. The choice of utility function here should therefore reflect the quality of outputting a certain word
in response to a given sensitive input word. In this work, we seek to privatize the input word by randomly outputting
a word which is close to it. Formalizing this idea, we now define the Levenshtein utility, which simply captures the
idea that a private output is of higher quality when it is closer to the input.
Definition 12: (Substitution Levenshtein Utility) Fix a constant α > 0, an alphabet Σ, and a language L ∈ 2Σ∗ .
Then, for an input word wi ∈ L, outputting the word wo ∈ L provides Substitution Levenshtein utility equal to
uα(wi, wo) =
1
dsL(wi, wo) + α
. (6)
Here, the inclusion of α ensures that uα is always defined, and smaller values of α will give higher values of
uα when wo is close to wi. This choice of utility has the benefit of decreasing rapidly as output words disagree
more with the input word, which will more strongly bias the output of the exponential mechanism toward better
output words while maintaining privacy.
B. Sensitivity Bounds
The next step in defining the exponential mechanism is to calculate the sensitivity of the utility function uα. In
particular, for a fixed output word wo, we must provide a bound on how much uα(·, wo) can differ across two
adjacent input words, and this bound will be used in defining the distribution over possible output words below.
Mathematically, we must bound the quantity
∆uα := max
v∈L
max
w1,w2∈L
(w1,w2)∈Adjsw,k
|uα(w1, v)− uα(w2, v)|, (7)
and we have the following lemma that does so.
Lemma 1: Fix α > 0 and k ∈ N. Then the sensitivity of uα is bounded via
∆uα ≤ k
α(k + α)
. (8)
Proof: Without loss of generality we may remove the absolute value signs and set
∆uα := max
v∈L
max
w1,w2∈L
(w1,w2)∈Adjsw,k
uα(w1, v)− uα(w2, v), (9)
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9because we can relabel w1 and w2 to make the right-hand side non-negative. Expanding the right-hand side, we
find
∆uα := max
v∈L
max
w1,w2∈L
(w1,w2)∈Adjsw,k
1
dsL(w1, v) + α
− 1
dsL(w2, v) + α
, (10)
and its non-negativity requires that dsL(w1, v) ≤ dsL(w2, v). To reduce the number of variables in the maximization,
we set
dsL(w2, v) = d
s
L(w1, v) + c (11)
where c ≥ 0. Using the triangle inequality we have
dsL(w2, v) ≤ dsL(w2, w1) + dsL(w1, v) ≤ dsL(w1, v) + k, (12)
which follows from the adjacency of w1 and w2. Combining this with Equation (11) gives
dsL(w1, v) + c ≤ dsL(w1, v) + k, (13)
which gives c ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Returning to Equation (10) we find that
∆uα := max
v∈L
max
w1∈L
c∈{0,...,k}
1
dsL(w1, v) + α
− 1
dsL(w1, v) + c+ α
(14)
For every v ∈ L, maximizing over w1 is easily done by setting w1 = v, which now gives
∆uα := max
c∈{0,...,k}
c
α(c+ α)
, (15)
where we have removed the maximization over v because all dependence upon v is now eliminated. The right-hand
side in Equation (15) is maximized by maximizing c, which completes the proof. 
Although we frequently expect this bound to be attained, we write it as an inequality to account for the case that
L does not contain any words exactly distance k apart.
C. Distribution Over Output Words
Given the above bound on sensitivity, the final step needed to define the exponential mechanism is determining
the required distribution over output words. The standard definition of the exponential mechanism [13] says that,
for a given sensitive input word x, a candidate word w should be output with probability p(w;x) satisfying the
proportionality relation
p(w;x) ∼ exp
(
uα(x,w)
2∆uα
)
. (16)
For the case of word adjacency (cf. Definition 8), one would need to determine a proportionality constant Kx,
and this would require computing the distance to every possible output word from every possible sensitive input
word x. Computing the Levenshtein distance has time complexity O(n2) [24], though the implied constants can
be very large for longer strings and large alphabets. Computing all possible pairwise distances can therefore easily
become intractable. However, for substitution word adjacency (cf. Definition 9), which is the focus of this paper,
explicitly computing Kx can be avoided, and this is shown in the next section.
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V. GENERATING DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE WORDS FROM A FIXED ALPHABET
In the previous section, we defined an exponential mechanism for substitution word -differential privacy. In this
section, we propose an efficient method for generating samples w′ ∼ p( · ;x). We propose to do this by synthesizing
appropriate randomized policies µ,x : Q × Σ → [0, 1] over the Levenshtein automaton associated with word x,
and these policies will randomly select each letter in an output word to implement the exponential mechanism for
words. Formally, we have the following formulation.
Problem 3: Given a Levenshtein automaton A|x|k,x as constructed by Algorithm 1, synthesize a policy µ,x such
that
|x|−1∏
e=0
µ,x(q
e, σe) = p(σ0:k;x). (17)
Note that in this approach, we are restricting ourselves to generating privatized output words w that are the same
length as x and are allowing arbitrary symbols from an alphabet Σ to be selected. That is, we are privatizing words
in the language L = Σ|x|. This means that ∆uα achieves its maximum value kα(k+α) as long as k ≤ |x|.
Given these assumptions, we propose the following procedure for indirectly synthesizing µ,x by sampling a
Levenshtin distance ` and computing the policy µ,x,` for only those words that are distance ` from x.
1) For a given input word x and an adjacency relation Adjsw,k, fix a desired substitution Levenshtein distance `
by drawing from the distribution
ρ(`; |x|, k) =
exp( α(k+α)2k(`+α) )
m∑
λ=1
exp( α(k+α)2k(λ+α) )
(18)
Note that ρ(`; |x|, k) = Prp(w;x)[dL(w, x) = `], the probability of selecting an output word w distance ` from
x.
2) Construct the subset of A|x|k,x,` ⊆ A|x|k,x that is backwards reachable from q|x|,` (the accepting state for words
of length |x| and distance exactly `) and denote the states of A|x|k,x,` as Qk,x,`
3) Synthesize µ,x,` : Qk,x,` × Σ→ [0, 1]
A. Synthesizing distance-restricted policies
In this section, we describe the procedure used to construct µ,x,`. First, we note that p(w;x) is a function of
dL(w, x), and thus all strings of the same Levenshtein distance to x should be equiprobable. In other words,
|x|−1∏
e=0
µ,x,`(q
e, σe) = pi|x|,`,Σ ∀q0 . . . q|x| ∈ L(Ak,x,`) (19)
The procedure outlined in Algorithm 2 uses this principle to construct µ,x,`. We assign a function V : Qk,x,` → N
such that V (q) is the number of unique paths from q that end in q|x|,`. Then, the weighting of the policy at each
point is equal to the proportion of unique paths that can be reached by applying the symbol compared to the total
number of unique paths reachable from the current state.
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Algorithm 2 Distance-Restricted Policy Construction
1: procedure SYNTHESIZEPOLICY(A|x|x,k,`)
2: V (q|x|,`)← 1
3: CurrQ← {q|x|,`}
4: counter = 0
5: while counter < ` do
6: for q s.t. (q, σ, q′) ∈ δx,`, q′ ∈ CurrQ do
7: V (q)←∑{σ∈Σ|(q,σ,q′′)∈δx,`} V (q′′)
8: q ∈ ActiveQ
9: for q ∈ ActiveQ, (q, σ, q′) ∈ δx,` do
10: µx,`(q, σ)← V (q
′)∑
{q′′|∃σ∈Σ(q,σ,q′′)∈δ} V (q′′)
11: CurrQ← ActiveQ
12: counter ← counter + 1
return µx,`
00,12start 10,4
11,4 21, 2
22, 1 32, 1
a 13
b 13 c
1
3 a
1
2 c
1
2
b 12
a 14 c
1
4
a 12 b
1
2
c1
Fig. 2: Levenshtein automaton for all words of length 3 and distance equal to 2 from the word abc from alphabet
{a, b, c}. The value of V (q) is shown in blue. The value of µ,x,`(q, σ) is shown in red
s0start s1
s3 s2
Fig. 3: Example transition system. For simplicity, the actions that enable a transition to state si is simply labeled
si. Thus, plans and runs are equivalent for this system.
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00, s0,5start 10, s1,2
11, s3,2
11, s2,1
21, s3,2
21, s2,1
22, s0,1 2,1
s1, 25
s 3
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2
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s 3
,1
s 2
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1
2
s 0
,1 2
s 2
, s
0
,1 2
,
1 2
s 0
,1 s 0
,1
s3,1
Fig. 4: (a) Product Levenshtein automaton for all traces of length 3 and Levenshtein distance less than or equal
to three from s1s2s3 from the transition system shown in Figure 3. (b) Restricted product automaton for traces
of Levenshtein distance exactly 2 from s1s2s3. The value of V (q) is shown in blue. The value of µ,x,`(q, σ) is
shown in red.
VI. GENERATING DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE RUNS FOR A TRANSITION SYSTEM
Here, we extend the principles used to generate differentially private words presented in Section V to generate
differentially private runs of a system. We do this via the introduction of the product Levenshtein automaton.
Definition 13: Let A|x|x,k = (Q,Σ, q0, δ, F ) be a Levenshtein automaton and let TS = (S, s0,Σ, T ) be a deter-
ministic transition system. The Product Levenshtein Automaton, A|x|x,k,TS = (QS ,Σ, q0 × s0, δTS , FTS) where
• QS ⊆ Q× S
• δTS = Q× S × Σ×Q× S such that (q, s, σ, q′, s′) ∈ δTS ⇔ (q, σ, q′) ∈ δ ∧ T (s, σ) = s′
• FTS = {(qf , s) ∈ QS |qf ∈ F}
In other words, A|x|x,k,TS is the synchronous product of A|x|x,k and TS. Further, w ∈ L(A|x|x,k,TS)⇔ w ∈ L(A|x|x,k)∧
w ∈ Li(TS). That is, every accepting word in the product corresponds to a sequence of inputs that when applied to
TS will result in a run that is within substitution Levenshtein distance k of w. An example of a product Levenshtein
automaton is shown in Figure 4(a).
Because the product Levenshtein automaton is a Levenshtein automaton, we can use the exact same procedure
as in Section V with using A|x|x,k,TS instead of A|x|x,k and ensuring that the maximum distance used to compute ρ is
the minimum of k and maxv∈Li(TS) dL(v, x). An example of applying Algorithm 2 to A|x|x,k,TS is shown in Figure
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4(b).
VII. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present results of some computational experiments that demonstrate the procedures in Sections
V and VI. We developed a package in the Julia programming language called LevenshteinPrivacy.jl that implements
the procedures in Sections V and VI. The code uses the LightGraphs.jl framework1. All experiments were performed
on a Windows Desktop PC with a 1.90 GHz processor and 16.0GB of RAM.
A. Case Study 1: Strings
For this set of experiments, we demonstrate the procedure from Section V by generating differentially private
versions of the string “american control conference 2019”. The alphabet is comprised of all the unique characters in
the input string. The Levenshtein automaton c contains 561 states and 1056 edges. The automaton was constructed
in 6.6s and generating 40 privatized strings required 1.53s of computation time. Figure 5a shows outputs from these
experiments with different values of the privacy parameter . As we can see, as  decreases (strength of privacy
increases), the outputs become less recognizable until they become almost entirely gibberish.
B. Case Study 2: Transition System
In this case study, we demonstrate the procedure outlined in Section VI. We constructed a transition system
with 225 states and edges that corresponds to a 15 by 15 “grid world”. The path we wish to privatize is shown
in Figure 5b(i). The resulting product automaton constructed by Algorithm has 6194 states and 18762 edges. The
computation time for constructing the product automaton was 193s and the time required to generate 100 samples
with  = 0.01 was 6.4s.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we presented a method for providing differential privacy to words over a finite alphabet. An
exponential mechanism was devised to generate possible output words, and the theory of Levenshtein automata
was applied to efficiently generate samples from this distribution. Numerical results validated these theoretical
developments and demonstrated their efficiency.
The first natural extension of this work is to the full Levenshtein distance, which will allow for not only
substitutions as in this work, but also deletions and insertions. A key challenge in doing so is efficiently generating
samples from the distribution over possible outputs. This work did so by considering strings of a fixed output length,
which corresponds to using the substitution Levenshtein distance rather than the full Levenshtein distance. Making
this extension will require fundamental innovations beyond this work, though successfully making this extension
will significantly broaden the scope of this work.
1https://github.com/JuliaGraphs/LightGraphs.jl
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(a) Samples of differentially private
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different values of the privacy param-
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(iv) (v) (vi)
(b) (i) Input trajectory (ii)-(vi) Example trajectories generated by
differentially private mechanism with  = 5.
Fig. 5: Numerical results for generate private strings over a finite alphabet and private runs of a transition system.
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